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Abstract 
Sensor networks enable a wide range of applications in both military and civilian domains. However, 
the deployment scenarios, the functionality requirements, and the limited capabilities of these networks 
expose them to a wide-range of attacks against control traffic (such as wormholes, rushing, Sybil attacks, 
etc) and data traffic (such as selective forwarding). In this paper we propose a framework called DICAS 
that mitigates such attacks by detecting, diagnosing, and isolating the malicious nodes. DICAS uses as a 
fundamental building block the ability of a node to oversee its neighboring nodes’ communication. On top 
of DICAS, we build a secure routing protocol, LSR, that provides additional protection against malicious 
nodes by supporting multiple node-disjoint paths. We analyze the security guarantees of DICAS and use 
ns-2 simulations to show its effectiveness against representative control and data attacks. The overhead 
analysis we present shows that DICAS is a lightweight protocol appropriate for securing resource 
constrained sensor networks.  
Index terms: sensor network security, neighbor monitoring, secure routing, control attack, data attack. 
1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks are emerging as a promising platform that enable a wide range of 
applications in both military and civilian domains such as battlefield surveillance, medical 
monitoring, biological detection, home security, smart spaces, inventory tracking, etc. Such 
networks consist of small, low-cost, resource-limited (battery, bandwidth, CPU, memory) nodes 
that communicate wirelessly and cooperate to forward data in a multi-hop fashion. Thus, they are 
especially attractive in scenarios where it is infeasible or expensive to deploy a significant 
networking infrastructure. However, the open nature of the wireless communication, the lack of 
infrastructure, the fast deployment practices, and the hostile deployment environments, make 
sensor networks vulnerable to a wide range of security attacks targeting the control or data 
traffic. Coping with control and data attacks in sensor networks is more challenging than in ad 
hoc wireless and wired networks due to the resource constrained environment. 
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Typical examples of control traffic are routing, monitoring whether a node is awake, asleep, or 
dead, topology discovery, and distributed location determination. Control traffic attacks include 
the (Ci) wormhole attack ( [16], [17]), (Cii) the rushing attack  [18], (Ciii) the Sybil attack  [11], 
(Civ) the sinkhole attack  [14], and (Cv) the HELLO flood attack  [14]. Control attacks are 
especially dangerous because they can be used to subvert the functionality of the routing protocol 
and create opportunities for a malicious node to launch data traffic attacks such as dropping all or 
a selective subset of data packets.  
In addition to control traffic attacks, sensor networks are also vulnerable to data traffic attacks. 
The most notable data traffic attacks are (Di) blackhole, (Dii) selective forwarding and (Diii) 
artificially delaying of packets, in which respectively a malicious node drops data (entirely or 
selectively) passing through it, or delays its forwarding. The attacks could result in a significant 
loss of data or degradation of service.  
The focus of this paper is on proposing mitigation techniques for control and data attacks in 
sensor networks.  We present a lightweight framework called DICAS, which mitigates control and 
data traffic attacks in sensor networks. DICAS not only detects the occurrence of an attack, but 
also diagnoses the malicious nodes involved in it and removes their capability of launching 
future attacks by isolating them from the network. The detection and isolation mechanisms are 
executed locally, without incurring a significant overhead. DICAS is suited to the low cost point 
of sensor networks since it does not require any specialized hardware (such as directional 
antennas  [17] or GPS) nor does it require time-synchronization among the nodes  [16]. DICAS 
achieves its security goals by exploiting a well-known technique whereby nodes oversee part of 
the traffic going in and out of their neighbors  [15],  [25],  [30],  [31]. The novelty of our work lies 
in presenting the technique as a standalone module – local monitoring – and analyzing its 
capabilities and limitations. We systematically lay out the fundamental structures and the state to 
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be maintained at each node for mitigating some representative attacks – Sybil, wormhole, 
rushing, and selective forwarding attacks. The first three are examples of attacks directed to 
control traffic while the last one is an example directed at data traffic. Independent of the 
detection mechanism, we propose a strategy to isolate malicious nodes locally in a distributed 
manner. 
We use DICAS to create a novel lightweight secure routing protocol called LSR that withstands 
known attacks against the routing infrastructure and provides additional protection against data 
attacks by supporting secure node-disjoint multiple route discovery. We analyze the detection 
coverage and the probability of false detection of DICAS. We also evaluate the memory, 
communication, and computation overhead of DICAS. Finally, we simulate the wormhole attack 
in ns-2 and show its effect on the network performance with and without DICAS. The results 
show that DICAS can achieve 100% detection of the wormholes for a wide range of network 
densities. They also show that the detection and isolation of the nodes involved in the wormhole 
can be achieved in a fairly short time after an attack starts. In addition, we simulate a combined 
Sybil and rushing attack to bring out the adverse impact on node-disjoint multipath routing and 
show the improvement using DICAS. The results show that LSR using DICAS is resilient to the 
combined attack and that the average number of node-disjoint routes discovered is not reduced. 
Our experiments with data monitoring show the feasibility of detecting the selective forwarding 
attack while monitoring only a fraction of the data traffic. 
In summary, our contributions are as follows: 
• We propose a mechanism to detect any control or data attack that manifests itself in one of 
dropping, misrouting, modifying, forging, injecting, or delaying of packets. 
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• We develop a toolset based on overheard information that can be mapped to detecting 
different classes of attacks. We analyze this toolset for different metrics, such as, false alarm 
probability, missed alarm probability, and latency of isolation. 
• We propose a mechanism that, based on information collected by our toolset, allows for 
diagnosing and isolating the malicious nodes. 
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of our toolset applied to both data and control attacks 
through simulations.  
This work builds on and extends our previous work in applying local monitoring as presented 
in  [36]  and  [37]. Details about the differences are presented in Section 2.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section  2 presents the related work in the area of 
security in wireless ad-hoc and sensor networks. Sections  3 and 4 describe DICAS and LSR, 
respectively. Section  5 presents attacks against routing and their mitigation using LSR with 
DICAS. Section  6 analyzes the coverage and overhead of DICAS, while Section  7 shows 
simulation results. Section  8 concludes the paper. 
2. Related Work 
In the last few years, researchers have been actively exploring many mechanisms to ensure the 
security of control and data traffic in wireless networks. These mechanisms can be broadly 
categorized into the following classes – cryptographic building blocks used as support for key 
management, authentication and integrity services, protocols that rely on path diversity, 
protocols that overhear neighbor communication, protocols that use specialized hardware, and 
protocols that require explicit acknowledgements. The cryptographic primitives are also used as 
building blocks for protocols of the other classes.  
In the context of ad hoc networks, HMAC and digital signatures  [33] have been used to provide 
end-to-end authentication of the routing traffic  [1], [4]. Intermediate node authentication of the 
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source traffic has been achieved via authentic broadcasting techniques using digital signatures 
 [19], hash trees  [2], or m-TESLA  [3]. One-way key chains and Merkle hash trees were also used 
as a defense against Sybil attacks  [38]. These protocols are restrictive and only capable of 
providing basic security guarantees, namely confidentiality and authenticity of the control and 
data traffic, or address only a specific attack such as Sybil. In addition, these protocols are not 
appropriate for sensor networks since the public key cryptography is beyond the capabilities of 
sensor nodes and the symmetric key based protocols proposed are too expensive in terms of node 
state and communication overhead. A specific solution for the wormhole attack proposed in  [42] 
uses keys known in a local region to prevent a message replayed by a malicious node from being 
decrypted at a distance. The solution uses specialized trusted nodes which cannot be affected by 
an wormhole. 
The path diversity techniques increase route robustness by first discovering multi-path routes 
 [19], [25], [26], [44] and then using these paths to provide redundancy in the data transmission 
between a source and a destination  [24]. The data is encoded and divided into multiple shares 
sent to the destination via different routes. The method is effective in well-connected networks, 
but does not provide enough path diversity in sparse networks. In addition, many of these 
schemes are expensive for sensor networks due to the data redundancy and are vulnerable to 
route discovery attacks, such as the Sybil attack, that prevent the discovery of non-adversarial 
paths.  
Mechanisms to overhear neighbor communication in a wireless channel have been used to 
minimize the effect of misbehaving nodes  [15], [26], [30]- [32]. One example is the watchdog 
scheme  [15], where the sender of a packet watches the behavior of the next-hop node for that 
packet. If the next-hop node drops or tampers with the packet, the sender announces it as 
malicious to the rest of the network. The scheme is vulnerable to blacklisting, does not work 
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correctly when malicious nodes collude, and can have a high error-rate due to collisions in the 
wireless channel. Neighbor watch has also been used to build trust relationships among nodes in 
the network  [30], [31], to build cooperative intrusion detection systems  [32], or to discover 
multiple node-disjoint routes  [26]. However, all these protocols use communication overhearing 
as an existing service without studying its feasibility, requirements, limitations, or performance 
in the resource-constrained sensor environment.  
Examples of protection mechanisms that require specialized hardware are  [16], [17], [40], [41]. 
The first scheme called packet leashes uses either tight time-synchronization or location 
awareness through GPS hardware, while the second uses directional antennas to detect wormhole 
attacks.  The work in  [40] relies on hardware threshold signature implementations to prevent one 
node from propagating errors or attacks in the whole network. In  [41], the protocol uses locators 
with high powered directional antennas that broadcast beacons which are used by sensors to 
localize themselves.  
Another technique proposed to detect malicious behavior that results in degradation of delivery 
ratio due to selective dropping of data, relies on explicit acknowledgement for received data 
using the same channel  [44] , or out-of-band channel  [43]. This method incurs high 
communication overhead which may be unsuitable for sensor networks and it has to be 
augmented by other techniques for diagnosis and isolation of the malicious nodes. A natural 
extension would be to reduce the control message overhead by reducing the frequency of ack-ing 
to one in every N data messages (in the above papers N=1). However, this is the subject of 
ongoing work and the challenge is to make the adversary detection be fast and occur before 
significant damage results. 
On the other hand, many secure sensor network routing protocols have also been introduced in 
the literature  [5]- [9]. These protocols are less complex than ad hoc or wired routing protocols 
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and are susceptible to a wide variety of attacks, as summarized by Karlof and Wagner  [14]. 
Table 1 enumerates the protocols and their vulnerabilities.  
Table 1: Attacks against secure wireless routing protocols (Numbers refer to the numbered list in 
the introduction) 
Routing protocol name Attacks 
Directional diffusion ( [5],  [7]) Ciii, Civ, Cv, Dii 
GPSR  [6]  Ciii, Dii 
Minimum cost forwarding  [8] Ci, Civ, Cv, Dii 
LEACH  [9], PEGASIS  [20] Cv, Dii 
Rumor routing  [10] Ci, Ciii, Civ, Dii 
SPAN  [13] Ciii, Cv 
Few of the protocols mentioned discuss the method for removing the malicious nodes from 
causing further damage in the network and even fewer provide a quantitative analysis of the 
detection coverage, which may be affected due to a faulty detector or environmental conditions.  
Our previous protocol called LITEWORP  [36] introduced local monitoring and used it to address 
a specific control attack, called the wormhole attack. The follow-on work in  [37] generalized the 
detection mechanism to detect a wide class of control attacks. However, the protocols did not 
focus on data attacks and did not address the issue of data traffic monitoring. This paper extends 
our previous work to address a wide class of control or data attacks in a unified framework and 
provides the corresponding checking mechanisms that can be used to detect each attack primitive 
as well as the corresponding overhead analysis. 
3. Description of DICAS 
In its goal of providing detection and isolation to control and data attacks, DICAS provides the 
following primitives - neighbor discovery and one-hop source authentication (Section  3.2) which 
are then used as the building blocks for the two main modules - local monitoring (Section  3.3) 
and local response (Section  3.5). 
3.1. System Model and Assumptions 
Attacker model: An attacker can control an external node (i.e., a node that does not know the 
cryptographic keys that allows it to be authenticated by the rest of the nodes in the network), or 
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an internal node, (i.e., a node that possesses all the keys required for it to be authenticated by 
other nodes in the network, but exhibits malicious behavior). An insider node may be created, for 
example, by compromising a legitimate node. A malicious node can perform all the attacks 
mentioned in Section  1, by itself or by colluding with other nodes. A malicious node can 
establish out-of-band fast channels (e.g., a wired link) or have a high powered transmission 
capability. 
System assumptions: We assume that all the communication links are bi-directional. A finite 
amount of time is required from a node’s deployment for it to be compromised, and to perform 
the first and second hop neighbor discovery protocol. We denote the first time with TCT  and the 
second time with TND. We assume that for a given node ni, all its first and second hop neighbors 
are deployed within TCT-2TND of the deployment of ni. This implies that for a given node, no 
malicious node exists in its one- or two-hop neighborhood until its neighbor discovery protocol 
completes. In our protocol we call the sensor node a guard when performing traffic overhearing 
and monitoring of neighbors. We assume that the network has sufficient redundancy, such that 
the attacker cannot compromise more than an application defined threshold of guards in a certain 
transmission range within a certain time. This means that any node in the network has some good 
guards. We assume that the network has a static topology. This does not rule out route changes 
due to natural and malicious node failures or route evictions from the routing cache. Finally, we 
assume a key management protocol, e.g.,  [22], is used to pre-distribute pair-wise keys such that 
any two nodes in the network can securely communicate with each other. 
3.2. Primitives: Neighbor Discovery and One Hop Source Authentication  
Neighbor discovery: This protocol is used to build a data structure of the first hop neighbors of 
each node and the neighbors of each neighbor. The data structure is used in local monitoring to 
detect malicious nodes and in local response to isolate these nodes. A neighbor of a node, X, is 
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any node that lies within the transmission range of X. As soon as a node, say A, is deployed in 
the field, it sends a one-hop broadcast of a HELLO message. Any node that receives the 
message, sends an authenticated reply to A, using the pair-wise shared key. For each reply 
received within a pre-defined timeout (TROUT,), A verifies the authenticity of the reply and adds 
the responder to its neighbor list, RA. Let RA = n1, ..., np and M = RA||Kcommit(A), where Kcommit(A) is 
the commitment key A uses to authenticate itself to its neighbors. Node A computes P = 
M||KAn1(M)||…|| KAnp(M). Then A sends a one-hop broadcast of packet P. A node nj that receives 
P, verifies M using KAnj. If the message is correctly verified, nj stores RA (nj’s second hop 
neighbors) and Kcommit(A). Hence, at the end of this neighbor discovery process, each node has a 
list of its direct neighbors and their neighbors as well as the commitment key of each one of its 
direct neighbors. This process is performed only once in the lifetime of a node and is secure in 
static wireless networks that follow our assumptions for time to node compromise. 
Commitment key generation and update: This protocol is used to generate and update the 
commitment key used by the one-hop source authentication protocol. The values of the 
commitment key at a node S (Kcommit(S)) are derived from a random seed (Kseed(S)) as Kcommit(S) = 
H(i) (Kseed(S)), where H is a one-way collision resistant hash function, i  takes values between 0 
and l(¥2), and l is the length of the sequence of values of Kcommit(S) that we call the commitment 
string. The first value of the commitment key Kcommit(S) that is exchanged with the neighbors 
during neighbor discovery is H(l)(Kseed(S)) = vl. The subsequent values of the commitment key (vl-
1,…, v0) are progressively disclosed to the neighbors during subsequent transmissions. Before the 
current commitment string {vl, vl-1,…, v0} is exhausted, a new one is generated at S {ul, ul-
1,…,u0}. The commitment key ul from the new string is authenticated to the neighbors using the 
last undisclosed key from the current string with the one-hop source authentication protocol. 
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One-hop source authentication: This protocol allows a node to distinguish between its 
neighbors to prevent identity spoofing among them. A node S authenticates its transmitted 
packets to the neighbors by attaching the last undisclosed value from the commitment string 
Kcommit(S).  When a neighbor of S, say B, receives the packet, it verifies the validity of Kcommit(S) by 
computing a hash function over it and comparing the result with the stored value of Kcommit(S). If  
Kcommit(S)   is valid, B stores it as the new commitment key value of S. However, this protocol may 
fail to provide the required authentication if an attacker blocks the transmission range of a certain 
source from the rest of network except itself. Therefore, the attacker can impersonate that source 
and generate valid packets. In such case, we revert to the well-known mTESLA authentication 
scheme  [21] which countermeasures such attacks. 
3.3. Local monitoring: Technique for Detection and Diagnosis of Attacks 
This module detects various attacks against the control and data traffic and diagnoses the 
malicious nodes involved in the attacks. Local monitoring starts immediately after the 
completion of neighbor discovery. It uses a collaborative detection strategy, where a node 
monitors the traffic going in and out of its neighbors. 
For a node, say M, to be able to monitor a node, say A, two conditions are required: (i) each 
packet forwarder must explicitly announce the immediate source of the packet it is forwarding, 







range of node Y
 
Figure 1: X, M, and N are guards of A over link X to A 
 
The first condition holds by design of 
the routing protocol and thus the second 
condition is the deciding criterion. 
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In such a case, we call M a guard node of A over the link from X to A. In Figure 1, nodes M, N, 
and X are the guards of A over the link from X to A. For a link (i, j), the sender i is a guard node 
for node j. Information for each packet sent from X to A is saved in a watch buffer at each guard 
for a time t. The information maintained depends on the particular attack under consideration.  
A malicious counter (MalC(i,j)) is maintained at each guard node, i, for every  node, j, which i 
is monitoring. MalC(i,j) is incremented for any suspect malicious activity of j that is detected by 
i. To account for intermittent natural failures that can occur at legitimate nodes, a node is 
determined to be misbehaving, only if the MalC goes above a threshold. 
In a general sense, the elementary activities underlying a large set of attacks in an ad hoc multi-
hop network are comprised of the following actions performed by the adversary node on an 
incoming packet – delay, drop, modify, and fabricate. There are elementary checking actions on 
the watch buffer for detecting each of these elementary malicious activities. The exact 
information stored in the watch buffer depends on the type of checking action – if delay, drop, or 
fabrication is to be detected, then only the header information that uniquely identifies the packet 
(in our implementation, the sender and the sequence number) need be stored. If however, 
modification to the payload is also to be detected, then the payload body or a hash of it has also 
to be stored. The actions are specified in Table 2. These checking actions form the basis of the 
detection protocol in DICAS. In this paper, we discuss the detection for a representative set of 
attacks, though the elementary checking activities can be combined to detect a larger class of 
attacks.  
Table 2: Elementary malicious activity and checking action 
Elementary malicious 
activity 
Elementary checking action 
Delay A packet lies unmatched in the buffer for time greater than an application 
dependant threshold. 
Drop Same as in delay. 
Modify The outgoing packet does not match with the packet in the watch buffer. The 
matching may be either a bit-wise comparison of the unchanging fields in the 
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packet (such as, the data, the original source and destination) or matching the hash 
values computed on these fields. 
Fabricate The outgoing packet does not have a corresponding packet in the watch buffer.  
3.4. Application of Local Monitoring for Data Attacks 
We refer to data attacks as the general class of attacks directed at the data traffic after the route 
has been established. The objective of these attacks is to disrupt the end to end transmission of 
data between a source and a destination. The disruption can be done through leaking information 
or through launching denial of service by manipulating the data. When leaking information, the 
adversary node does not manipulate the data but gathers information based on data that flows 
through it. In the denial of service attack, the adversary actively manipulates the data packets 
through delay, drop, fabrication, or modification. Information leaking is difficult to detect by 
monitoring the data traffic alone. This mode of attack becomes particularly insidious when the 
adversary uses control attacks such as the wormhole attack to create an opportunity to control a 
disproportionately large portion of the routes in the network. We use the local monitoring 
approach applied to the control traffic to defeat this mode of attack.  
For the second type of data attacks (DoS by manipulating the data), local monitoring can be 
applied to the data traffic using the elementary checking activities mentioned in Table 2. This 
approach is useful in particular where an adversary node is in the position of having large 
amounts of data traffic flowing through it due to its strategic position in the network, without the 
need to launch a wormhole attack. The detection of data traffic manipulation in such a case can 
significantly improve the delivery ratio of the network.  
In DICAS, the guard node maintains in its watch buffer a data structure containing the following 
information about the observed packets: immediate source, immediate destination, original 
source, final destination, packet id (unique wrt a sender), and packet information. The packet 
information may be the unchanging fields in the packet header, the hash value of the unchanging 
fields in the header and the payload, or the entire packet itself. The elementary checking actions 
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mentioned in Table 2 are performed on this information. The key distinction of data traffic 
monitoring from control traffic monitoring is the volume of traffic. Therefore, each guard node 
selects a fraction of the data traffic to monitor. In the current design, this is a global parameter 
for all the nodes. The fraction of traffic monitored is calculated over a given time window. Also 
for detecting modification, only hash values are matched, using a collision free yet 
computationally inexpensive hashing technique, such as MD5  [35]. 
3.5. Local Response and Isolation 
Detection and diagnosis are only the first steps towards protecting the network. The local 
response and isolation module is used to propagate the detection knowledge to the neighbors of 
the malicious node and to take the appropriate response to isolate it from the network. The 
following local response algorithm is triggered by a guard node, say a, when a node, say A, is 
suspected because its MalC counter value crosses the threshold.   
1. Node a revokes A from its neighbor list, and sends to each neighbor of A, say D, an 
authenticated alert message indicating that A is a suspected malicious node. The 
communication is authenticated using the shared key between a and D to prevent false 
accusations.  
2. When D receives the alert, it verifies its authenticity, that a is a neighbor to A, and that A is 
D’s neighbor. It then stores IDa in an alert buffer associated with A.  
3. When D receives enough alerts, γ, about A, it isolates A by marking A’s status as revoked in 
the neighbor list.  We call γ  the detection confidence index. 
4. After isolation, D does not accept any packet from or forward any packet to a revoked node.  
In addition to removing the malicious nodes from the network, this module makes the response 
process fast since the detection knowledge need not propagate throughout the network. This 
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module is lightweight in the number of messages (one to each neighbor of A, only on detection) 
and the number of hops each message traverses (maximum two hops). Note that g is useful for 
reducing the possibility of framing with a higher value being favored for this purpose. Framing is 
the attack where a malicious node, acting as a guard, sends alert about a correct node. If g is set 
to infinity then a node only trusts itself and the framing probability is zero. 
4. LSR: Lightweight Secure Routing 
LSR is an on-demand routing protocol, sharing many similarities with the AODV  [23] protocol. 
However, LSR has significant differences in order to enhance security. The design features of 
LSR described below make it resilient to a large class of control attacks such as wormhole, Sybil, 
and rushing attacks, as well as authentication and ID spoofing attacks. Combined with DICAS, 
LSR can deterministically detect and isolate nodes involved in launching these attacks.  
4.1. Route Discovery and Maintenance 
Route Request: When a node, say S, needs to discover a route to a destination, say D, it 
generates a route discovery packet (REQ) that contains: a flag to indicate that it is a route request 
packet (FREQ), the sender’s identity (IDS), the destination’s identity (IDD), and a unique sequence 
number (SN). The SN is incremented with every new REQ and is used to prevent the replay of 
the REQ packet. Node S then calculates a message authentication code (MAC) of the packet 
using the shared key between S and D (KSD). Finally, S generates and attaches the next value of 
the commitment key Kcommit(S) to the REQ packet and broadcasts it. 
1. [At S] REQ = FREQ || IDS || IDD || SN  
2. S Broadcast⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→REQ||MACKSD(REQ)||Kcommit(S)||IDS 
A neighbor Z of S accepts the REQ packet if the associated Kcommit(S) is valid. Then Z removes 
Kcommit(S) from the REQ, attaches IDZ, and forwards the REQ. 
  
15
An intermediate node B that is not a direct neighbor to S stores the first REQ packet it receives. 
Node B also keeps the identity of every different neighbor that forwards a subsequent copy of the 
same REQ during a rush time, Tr, selected randomly from [Tmin, Tmax], as in  [18]. When Tr runs 
out or when a certain number of requests, Nr, is collected, whichever occurs first, B broadcasts a 
randomly selected copy of the REQ copies that it has. Assume, without loss of generality, that B 
selects the one forwarded by W. For each source-destination pair, node B keeps the identity of 
the node from which it receives the forwarded REQ (IDW). Node B then appends IDB and IDW to 
the REQ and broadcasts it. The process continues until the REQ reaches D.  
3. B Broadcast⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ REQ||MACKSD(REQ)||IDW|| IDB 
Route Reply: When D receives the REQ packet, it verifies the authenticity of the source using 
the shared key KSD. Then D generates a route reply packet REP that contains: a flag to indicate 
that it is a route reply packet (FREP), the sender identity (IDS), the destination identity (IDD), and 
a SN. Node D then calculates a MAC value over the packet using KSD. Node D generates and 
attaches the next value of the commitment key Kcommit(D) to the REP packet. Finally, D unicasts 
the REP packet back to the previous hop as determined by the REQ packet. Let A be the 
immediate previous hop from D and C the immediate previous hop from A. 
1. [At D] REP = FREP||IDS||IDD|| SN 
2. D ? A:REP|| MACKSD(REP) || Kcommit(D)||IDD||IDA  
When A receives the REP packet, it verifies and removes Kcommit(D), updates its routing table as 
follows - <Destination, Next-hop>: {D, D}, {S, C}. Node A then appends IDD||IDA||IDC and 
sends the REP packet to C.  
3. [At A]  Verify and remove Kcommit(D). Set <Destination, Next-hop>: {D, D}, {S, C} 
4. A ? C: REP||MACKSD(REP)|| IDD || IDA || IDC  
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The REP continues to propagate using the reverse path of the corresponding REQ towards S. 
Node S verifies the authenticity of the reply using KSD and updates its routing table to node D.  
The route maintenance in LSR, as in AODV, is triggered when a broken link is detected and a 
new route is discovered by using the above protocol for route discovery.  
Note that in LSR, the source chooses the route corresponding to the fastest route reply and not 
the shortest-hop route, to guard against attacks that modify the hop count. A longer but less 
congested route is preferred to a shorter but congested route, as in  [19].   
4.2. Node-Disjoint Multipath Discovery  
A beneficial feature of LSR is its ability to increase the number of node-disjoint routes between 
a source and a destination. In many on demand ad-hoc and sensor network routing protocols, an 
intermediate node forwards the first announcement of a request and suppresses any following 
announcements, such as in AODV  [23]. As a result, multiple routing paths may have common 
nodes in them. In LSR, each node, say B, backs off for a random time (Tr) before forwarding the 
REQ. During Tr, B buffers all the announcements of the same request. At the same time, B listens 
to any neighbor, say E, whose rush timer, Tr times out and which forwards one of its REQ 
copies. If B has the same REQ copy, from the same previous hop, as that forwarded by E, B 
















(a) (b) (c)  
Figure 2: Example of node-disjoint routes. 
An example is shown in Figure 2. Let B 
receive REQs from nodes X, Y, and Z, and let E 
be a neighbor of B which also receives from X. 
Let the REQ from X be the first to arrive at both B and E, Figure 2(a). If nodes B and E forward 
the first REQ they receive and drop the others as in AODV, then multiple paths will be formed 
with X in them, Figure 2(b). However, using our technique, assuming that the timer of E runs out 
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before that of B and that E broadcasts the message it received from X, then B will drop X’s 
packet from its buffer. The resulting paths are thus disjoint, Figure 2(c). 
The destination replies to every REQ copy it receives through a different neighbor. An 
intermediate node creates a routing table entry when it forwards the reply for the first time. 
Subsequently, it does not forward any further replies to prevent itself from being inserted in 
multiple routes. In order to detect malicious behavior by its neighbors, each node monitors 
replies going out of the neighbors. If a neighbor forwards a specific reply more than once, it is 
considered malicious and dropped from all the routes the node has.  For example, let node B 
receive the REP packets for a given route creation procedure from two non neighbor nodes X and 
Y. A correct node forwards only the first REP. However, if B is malicious, it may send the two 
replies to two different neighbors, say A and α respectively. Therefore, B succeeds in including 
itself in two “different routes”. However, in LSR, this misbehavior can be detected by X and Y 
since they overhear B’s forwarded REPs. Then they evict all the routes through B.  
5. Attacks and Countermeasures 
In this section, we present three representative attacks that can be launched against a routing 
protocol and show how they can be detected in LSR with DICAS. We also present a representative 
attack that can be launched against the data traffic and show how it can be detected using DICAS.  
5.1. ID Spoofing and Sybil Attacks 
In this attack, an attacker presents one (ID spoofing) or more (Sybil attack) spoofed identities to 
the network  [11]. Those identities could either be new fabricated identities or stolen identities 
from legitimate nodes. The Sybil attack can have many adverse impacts, such as, multipath 
routing  [12] and collaborative protocols that use aggregation and voting  [34]. 
Using DICAS with LSR yields the following desirable properties to countermeasure the effect of 
ID spoofing and Sybil attacks: 
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 (i) The single hop neighbor list data structure prevents a node from spoofing the identity of a 
non-neighbor node. A node will not accept (forward) traffic from (to) a non-neighbor node. (ii) 
The one-hop source authenticated broadcasting prevents a node from generating traffic using 
spoofed identity of a neighbor node since each node must authenticate its generated traffic to the 
neighbors. (iii) Local monitoring detects a forwarding node when spoofing a neighbor’s identity. 
As shown in Figure 1, if A receives a packet from X, then A can not forward the packet claiming 
that it is being forwarded by one of its neighbors, say M. None of the guards of M over the link 
from X to M overhear such a packet; also the guards of A over the link from X to A accuse A of 
not forwarding the packet.  
5.2. Wormhole Attack 
In the wormhole attack  [16], [17] a malicious node captures packets from one location in the 
network, and “tunnels” them to another malicious node at a distant point, which replays them 
locally. The tunnel can be established in many different ways, such as through an out-of-band 
hidden channel (e.g., a wired link), packet encapsulation, or high powered transmission. The 
tunnel creates the illusion that the two end-points are very close to each other, by making 
tunneled packets arrive either sooner or with a lesser number of hops compared to the packets 
sent over normal routes. This allows an attacker to subvert the correct operation of the routing 
protocol, by controlling numerous routes in the network.  
Once traffic is forced to flow through a node, 
it may launch denial of service against the data 
traffic. The wormhole attack can be launched 
without having access to any cryptographic keys 












The legitimate path without  wormhole 
An out-of-band channel between M1 and M2






Figure 3: A wormhole attack scenario 
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DICAS enables detection and isolation of malicious nodes lauching a wormhole attack as follows:  
Local monitoring detects the nodes involved in tunneling the route control packets and local 
response disables the tunnel from being established in the future by isolating the malicious 
nodes. Each guard saves the SN, the type, the source, the destination, the immediate sender, and 
the immediate receiver of every input packet to the monitored node. Consider the scenario in 
Figure 3. Two colluding nodes, M1 and M2, use an out-of-band channel or packet encapsulation 
to tunnel routing information between them. When M1 receives the REQ initiated by S, it tunnels 
the REQ to M2. Node M2 has two choices for the previous hop — either to append the identity of 
M1, or append the identity of one of M2’s neighbors, say X. In the first choice all the neighbors of 
M2 reject the REQ because they all know, from the stored data structure of the two-hop 
neighbors, that M1 is not a neighbor to M2. In the second case, all the guards of the link from X to 
M2 (X, N, and L) detect M2 as fabricating the route request since they do not have the information 
for the corresponding packet from X in their watch buffer. In both cases M2 is detected, and the 
guards increment the MalC of M2. Similarly, when M1 receives the REP tunneled from M2 it has 
the same choices as M2 and a similar scheme is used by the guards of the incoming link to M1. 
An alternate technique for attracting data traffic is through the rushing attack whereby a 
malicious node forwards the REQ packet without waiting. This is defeated in LSR since an 
intermediate node does not forward the first route request it receives (may be from a rushing 
malicious node), but rather, waits and collects copies of the REQ from different neighbors and 
randomly selects one of them to rebroadcast. 
5.3. Selective Forwarding Attack 
This is an example of an attack launched against the data traffic, where the adversary node 
selectively drops packets flowing through it. The attack can impact the end-to-end throughput in 
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the network and if a reliable, continuous message stream is required, then this causes wastage of 
resources by inducing repeated retransmissions.  
DICAS enables the detection of selective forwarding as follows: 
Information about the incoming data packet is stored in the watch buffer of the guard node. If the 
incoming packet stays in the watch buffer unmatched beyond a threshold period of time, the 
guard node increments the MalC value for the node being monitored. In the case of the selective 
forwarding attack, the packet which is dropped by the adversary node, will remain unmatched in 
the guard node’s watch buffer. The guard node monitors a fraction of the data traffic, with the 
packet to be monitored being chosen randomly. This decision is independent of the decision of 
the adversary node to drop packets and therefore there is a vanishingly small probability that the 
set of packets dropped and the set of packets not monitored will exactly match over the time 
window over which the MalC value is aggregated. The adversary node will thus be detected 
when the MalC value crosses the threshold. 
6. DICAS analysis 
6.1. Coverage analysis 
In this section, we quantify the probability of missed detection and false detection of a generic 
attack as the network density increases and the detection confidence index varies. The results 
provide some interesting insights. For example, we are able to find the required network density 







Figure 4: (a) The area where a node can guard 
the link between S and D; (b) Illustration for 
detection accuracy 
Consider a homogeneous network where the 
nodes are uniformly distributed in the field. 
Consider any two randomly selected neighbor 




Nodes S and D are separated by a distance X, and the communication range is r. X is a random 
variable with probability density function of fX(x) = 2x/r2 with range (0,r). This follows from the 
assumption of uniform distribution of the nodes.  
The guard nodes for the link between S and D are those nodes that lie within the 
communication range of S and D, the shaded area in Figure 4(a). This area is given 
by ( ) 22 1 2( ) 2 cos 2
2 4
x xArea x r x r
r
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Now, as in  [28] where IEEE 802.11 was analyzed, we assume that each packet collides on the 
channel with a constant and independent probability, PC.  
Analysis for missed detection  
Following Figure 4(b), the four malicious actions may be missed due to different combinations 
of events. Delay and drop are missed if there is a collision on the S→G link, fabrication for the 
D→G link, and modification for both S→G and D→G links. Thus, the probability of missed 
detection PM = ¼(3PC+PC2). Assume that m packet attacks (fabrication, modify, drop, etc.) occur 
within a certain time window, T, with the different attacks being equiprobable. Also assume that 
a guard must detect at least β attacks to cause the MalC for a node to cross the threshold, and 
thus generate an alert and the increment to MalC is the same for each activity. Then, the alert 
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⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ . Thus, assuming independence of 
collision events among the different guards, the probability that at least g of the guards generate 
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Figure 5 shows the probability of detecting an attack (e.g. the wormhole) with m = 7, b = 5, g  = 
3, the number of compromised nodes M = 2, and PC = 0.10 at NB = 3. Thereafter, PC is assumed 
to increase linearly with the number of neighbors (note that we do not use power control in the 
network). The number of guards is determined from NB using Equation (I). Since the number of 
guards increases as the number of neighbors increases, the probability of detection increases 
since it becomes easier to receive the alarm from g guards. However, the collision probability 
also increases with increasing node density, and thus the probability of detection starts to fall 
rapidly at a point. Beyond 24 neighbors, the collision is so high that the detection probability 
becomes zero. 
 
Figure 5: Probability of wormhole detection 
  
Figure 6: Probability of false alarm 
As expected, as g increases, the probability of detection decreases since it becomes harder to 
collect the evidence from all the γ guard nodes.  
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Analysis for false detection 
Following Figure 4(b), a false alarm occurs due to falsely implicating a node for dropping, 
delaying, fabricating, or modifying packets. The false detection of each activity is caused by a 
different set of events – drop through no collision on the S→G link and either collision on the 
S→D link or no collision on the S→D link and collision on the D→G link; fabrication through 
collision on the S→G link and no collision on the S→D link and the D→G link. According to 
our model for analysis, a modified packet cannot give rise to false detection and a delay is not 
possible either since it will map to drop at the guard. The events for drop and fabrication are 
disjoint and therefore the individual probabilities are summed to give the combined probability 
of false alarm as 22 (1 ) (1 )FA C C C CP P P P P= − + − . Assume that S sends m packets to D for 
forwarding within a certain time window, T. The probability that D is falsely accused is the 
probability that D is suspected of malicious actions for b or more packets. Thus, the probability 
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probability that at least γ guards generate false alarms is given by 
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Figure 6 shows the probability of false alarm as a function of the number of neighbors for the 
same parameters as in Figure 5 except γ=8. The non monotonic nature of the plot can be 
explained as follows. As the number of neighbors increases, so does the number of guards. 
Initially, this increases the probability that at least γ guards have the sequence of events outlined 
above that cause them to suspect D. Beyond a point, however, the increase in the number of 
neighbors increases the collision probability. This increases the probability that all the three 
packets are missed at the guard and thus does not lead to false detection. The worst case false 
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alarm probability is still negligible (about 4.5×10-3, with as high as 17 neighbors). With number 
of neighbors up to 13, the probability is still zero. 
6.2. Cost Analysis 
The memory, computation, and bandwidth overhead of DICAS are tolerable for resource 
constrained environments, such as sensor networks. For memory, each node needs to store a first 
and a second hop neighbor list, a commitment key for each first hop neighbor, its own 
commitment string, a watch buffer, and an alert buffer. The runtime state with fluctuating size is 
the watch buffer, whose size is higher if the guard is monitoring a malicious node that is delaying 
or dropping packets. The time for which the packet is kept in the watch buffer is relatively small, 
being determined by the MAC layer delay for acquiring the channel. From the experiments 
presented in the next section, we find that a watch buffer of size 50 is sufficient for all the 
experimental conditions. Each entry in the watch buffer is 14 bytes − 2 bytes each for the 
immediate source, the immediate destination, and the original source, and 8 bytes for the 
sequence number of the REP (REQ). The computation overhead is negligible since the 
operations for each message is lookup and addition or deletion in the small watch buffer. The 
bandwidth overhead is incurred only during initialization and when an adversary is detected. 
Assuming nodes are awake, the listening due to the role of a guard does not incur any bandwidth 
overhead.  
7. Simulation Results: Control Attacks 
We use the ns-2 simulator  [29] to simulate a data exchange protocol over LSR, individually 
without DICAS (the baseline) and with DICAS. We distribute the nodes randomly over a square 
area with a fixed average node density. Thus, the length of the square varies (80m to 204m) with 
the number of nodes (20-250).  We first simulate the wormhole attack using out-of-band direct 
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channels between the colluding nodes. After a wormhole is established, the malicious nodes at 
each end of the wormhole drop all the packets forwarded to them.  
Each node acts as a source and generates data according to a Poisson process with rate m. The 
destination is chosen at random and is changed using an exponential random distribution with 
rate x. A route is evicted if unused for TOutRoute time. Isolation latency is defined as the time 
between when the node performs its first malicious action to the time by which all the neighbors 
of the node have isolated it.  
The experimental parameters are given 
in Table 3. The results are averages over 
30 runs. The malicious nodes are chosen 
at random so that they are more than 2 
hops away from each other.  
Table 3: Input parameter values  
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Tx Range (r) 30 m g 2-8 
NB 8 m 100 
TOutRoute 50 sec M 0-10 
t, Nr 0.05 s, 5 b 5  
























































Figure 8: Fraction of dropped packets & 
malicious routes 
Figure 7 shows the number of packets dropped as a function of simulation time for the 100-
node setup with 2 and 4 colluding nodes.  The attack is started 50 seconds after the start of the 
simulation. Since the numbers are vastly different in the baseline and with DICAS, they are shown 
on separate Y-axes (the left corresponding to the Baseline and the right corresponding to the 
DICAS case ). In the baseline case, since wormholes are not detected and isolated, the cumulative 
number of packets dropped continues to increase steadily with time. But in DICAS, as wormholes 
are identified and isolated permanently, the cumulative number stabilizes. Note that the 
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cumulative number of packets dropped grows for some time even after the wormhole is locally 
isolated at 75 seconds. This is because the cached routes that contain the wormhole continue to 
be used until route timeout occurs. 
Figure 8 shows a snapshot, at simulation time of 2000 seconds, of the fraction of the total 
number of packets dropped to the total number of packets sent, and the fraction of the total 
number of routes that involve wormholes to the total number of routes established. This is shown 
for 0-4 compromised nodes for the baseline and with DICAS. With 0 or 1 compromised node, 
there is no adverse effect on normal traffic since no wormhole is created. The relationship 
between the number of dropped packets and the number of malicious routes is not linear. This is 
because the route established through the wormhole is more heavily used by data sources due to 
the aggressive nature of the malicious nodes at the ends of the wormhole. If we track these 
output parameters over time, with DICAS, they converge to zero as no more malicious routes are 
established or packets dropped, while with baseline case they would reach a steady state as a 
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Figure 10: Average number of node-disjoint 
paths in ideal case, AODVM, and LSR 
Figure 9 bears out the analytical result for the detection probability as γ is varied with NB  = 15 
and M = 2. As γ increases, the detection probability goes down due to the need for alarm 
reporting by a larger number of guards, in the presence of collisions.  Also the isolation latency 
goes up, although it is very small (less than 30 seconds) even at the right side of the plot.
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Next, we simulate combined rushing and Sybil attacks over a network of 250 nodes deployed in 
a 300 m µ 300 m field. We compare the average number of node-disjoint paths discovered per 
route request of an ideal search algorithm, AODVM  [27], and LSR with DICAS. In the ideal 
search, the topology of the entire network is known to the source that uses the shortest path first 
search algorithm. AODVM creates node-disjoint routes by having every node overhear 
neighboring nodes’ REP packets and deciding to forward its own REP such that a neighbor is not 
included in two routes for a given source-destination pair. However, it does not consider any 
control attacks.  
Figure 10 shows the average number of node-disjoint paths as a function of the number of hops 
in the shortest path between two nodes. The figure shows that, in a failure free environment, LSR 
and AODVM perform almost identically. In a malicious scenario (AODV malicious and DICAS 
malicious scenarios), each of 10 malicious nodes launches rushing and Sybil attacks. When a 
malicious node receives a REQ packet, it rushes to broadcast Nr copies of the REQ, each with a 
different fake identity. Figure 10 shows that LSR with DICAS is robust to the attack (LSR and 
LSR_mal plots overlap), while the average number of node-disjoint paths in AODVM is reduced 
by 22% (for distant source-destination pairs) to 32% (for closer pairs). Note that as the length of 
the path increases, the effect of the attacks in AODVM decreases. This is because even though 
the multiple routes appear to be disjoint at the attacker they may converge at some other 
intermediate node. These are then discarded by the source thereby ultimately foiling the 
attacker’s goal.  
8. Simulation Results: Data Attacks 
Adversary model: We are simulating the selective forwarding attack launched by a group of 
malicious nodes in two attack scenarios. In the first scenario, the malicious nodes collude and 
establish wormholes in the network. In the second scenario, the malicious nodes are independent 
  
28
and each node performs selective forwarding without any collusion or coordination with other 
malicious nodes. Unless otherwise mentioned, we use the wormhole adversary nodes. Each node 
selectively drops a fraction 0.6 of the traffic that passes through it. 
Input metrics: Fraction of data monitored (fdat) – each guard node randomly monitors a given 
fraction of the data packets. At other times, it can be asleep from the point of view of a guard’s 
responsibility. Increment to malicious counter – This is the increment that a guard node does to 
the malicious counter for a given node for a single malicious action. 
Output metrics: Delivery ratio – The fraction of the number of packets delivered to the 
destination by the number of packets sent out by a node averaged over all the nodes in the 
network. Watch buffer size – This is the runtime count of the maximum size of the watch buffer 
being maintained at a guard, measured in number of entries. The maximum is taken over all the 
guards.  
Simulation parameters: Here, we mention the parameter settings that are different from the 
experiments on control attacks. Unless explicitly varied as a control parameter in an experiment, 
the total number of nodes in the network N = 100, destination change rate l = 50, g = 3, MalC 
threshold beyond which a node is determined to be erroneous is 150, and the number of 
malicious wormhole nodes M = 4. The simulation time is 1500 seconds.  
8.1. Algorithm for selection of MalC increment  
An important design parameter in DICAS is the increment to the malicious counter value upon 
detecting a malicious event. On the one hand, we want the increment to be large for higher 
detection probability, fast detection, and small watch buffer size. On the other hand, we want the 
increment to be small to reduce the percentage of false alarms. 
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We conduct an experiment to design the malicious counter increment of a network with fdat = 
0.4 and number of wormhole nodes = 4. For the purpose of this experiment, we look at the 
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Figure 12: Effect of fraction of data monitored on 
delivery ratio 
Figure 11 shows that the percentage of false alarms increases as the MalC increment increases. 
With higher MalC increment, the chance that natural errors, such as collisions, cause the MalC to 
reach the threshold becomes higher, which results in an overall increase in the percentage of 
false alarms. The figure also shows that the detection percentage increases as the MalC 
increment value increases to a point (increment = 7) after which it remains approximately 
constant. As the size of the increment increases, a smaller number of events causes the MalC 
threshold to be reached which enhances the opportunity of detecting malicious nodes, even those 
that are involved in a small number of malicious events. The delivery ratio also increases with 
increasing MalC increment value to a point (MalC increment = 7) after which it remains 
approximately constant. 
Faster detection results in fewer number of 
dropped data packets. However, the rate slows 
down beyond a point since any additional increase 
does not substantially accelerate the process.  
Table 4: MalC increment per malicious activity 
used for the experiments 











For the rest of the experiments in the section, for each given fdat, we choose the increment as the 
lower of the two points – the point where the percentage detection reaches its maxima and the 
point where the knee of the false detection curve lies. This gives us a reasonable combination of 
low false alarm rate and high detection rate. The values of MalC increment used for the rest of 
the experiments are summarized in Table 4. 
8.2. Effect of fraction of data monitored (fdat) 
The amount of data traffic is typically several orders of magnitude larger than the amount of 
control traffic. It is not reasonable for a guard node to monitor all the data traffic in its monitored 
links. Therefore a reasonable optimization, as proposed in Section  3.4, is to monitor only a 
fraction of the data traffic. In this set of experiments, our goal is to investigate the effect of this 
optimization on the output metrics. 
Figure 12 shows the variations of delivery ratio as we vary fdat with four wormhole malicious 
nodes. The MalC increment for each fdat is designed as shown in Section  8.1 with an inverse 
relation to the fdat. The selection of the MalC increment value according to the algorithm keeps 





























 % False Alarms
% Detection
 









0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1






























Figure 14: Isolation latency and Watch buffer 
size 
Figure 13 shows that the percentage of false alarms decrease as fdat increases. More available 
data makes it easier to distinguish a good node from a malicious node. The higher the value of 
fdat, the lower is the increment to the malicious counter and thus the smaller the chance of 
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reaching the malicious counter threshold by natural errors only. These two factors help reduce 
the probability of false alarms with increasing fdat. Figure 13 also shows the variations of 
detection percentage as we vary fdat. By selecting the appropriate MalC increment value, we 
manage to keep the detection percentage almost stable and above 95% irrespective of fdat. As fdat 
increases, MalC increment decreases. This causes the MalC threshold to be reached slower at a 
guard node, which results in increasing the isolation latency of the malicious nodes. Also the 
higher fdat lays it open to the possibility of some packets being missed due to natural collisions 
and thereby preventing the increment to the malicious counter and therefore, reaching the 
threshold. Note however, that the delivery ratio is largely unaffected (Figure 12) since a 
malicious node may still not be completely isolated by all its neighbors. However, it does not 
have the opportunity for too much damage since most of its neighbors have already isolated it 
and when new routes are created, the malicious node is excluded. As the value of fdat increases, 
the size of the watch buffer expectedly increases. This increases the overhead of local monitoring 
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Figure 16: Delivery ratio as a function of 
malicious nodes 
Figure 15 shows the benefit in terms of energy overhead of monitoring only a small fraction of 
data. For this experiment, we implement the algorithm for storing packets in the watch buffer 
and searching in it through a linear search. The algorithm was implemented on our testbed 
consisting of Crossbow Mica2 motes. The algorithm takes the size of the watch buffer as input. 
For the experiment, the maximum size of the watch buffer over all the guard nodes from the 
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simulations is used. The algorithm is executed to search for a random number between 0 and 0.2 
million. Since the size of the watch buffer is much smaller, most of the searches are unsuccessful 
mimicking a guard node overseeing a malicious node which is dropping packets. Since 
unsuccessful searches take longer than successful ones, this is another cause for overestimating 
the execution time. The network is considered to be synchronized and therefore wakes up and 
falls asleep in a synchronized manner. Therefore, there is no overhead at the guard due to 
listening (it would have been awake due to the synchronization anyway) and the only source of 
overhead is storing the watch buffer entries and searching in them. For the current draw, we use 
the parameters from the Mica2 motes: CPU active 8mA, idle 3.3mA, sleep  8µA, serial flash 
write 15mA, serial flash read 4mA, serial flash sleep 2µA. Since a smaller fraction of the data 
monitored results in smaller watch buffer sizes and fewer number of searches, the overhead with 
all the data being monitored is about 18 times the overhead with only a fraction 0.2 of the data 
being monitored.  
8.3. Effect of number of malicious nodes 
Figure 16 shows the effect of increasing the number of malicious nodes when launching two 
different scenarios of attacks – the perfectly colluding wormhole nodes and the independent 
adversary nodes. Note that in both scenarios, the delivery ratio falls almost linearly as we 
increase the number of malicious nodes from 2 to 6. This is due to the packets dropped before 
the malicious nodes are detected and isolated. As the number of malicious nodes increases, this 
initial drop increases and thus the delivery ratio decreases. A second-order effect for the decrease 
in the delivery ratio is the decrease in the number of available guards making it more difficult to 
obtain agreement from γ guard nodes. However, the delivery ratio is always above 92% for the 
wormhole scenario and above 96% for the independent scenario. Note also that the delivery ratio 
in the independent scenario is higher than that in the wormhole scenario. This is due to the 
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aggressive nature of the wormhole which attracts traffic from many nodes through the malicious 
nodes and increases the initial traffic dropped before the malicious nodes get isolated. 
Figure 17 shows the percentage of false alarms and the percentage of detection as a function of 
the number of malicious nodes. The percentage of false alarms increases as the number of 
malicious nodes increases because not all guard nodes come to the decision to isolate a malicious 
node at the same time. Therefore a given guard node may suspect another guard node when the 
latter isolates a malicious node but the former still has not. For example, a guard node G1 detects 
a malicious node M earlier than the other guard nodes for the link to M. G1 subsequently drops 
all the traffic forwarded to M and is therefore suspected by other guard nodes for M. This 
problem can be solved by having an authenticated one-hop broadcast whenever a guard node 
performs a local detection. The detection percentage falls almost linearly as we increase the 
number of colluding malicious nodes from 2 to 6 due to the decrease in the number of available 
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Figure 17: False alarms and detection as a 
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Figure 18: Isolation latency and watch buffer size 
as a function of number malicious nodes
Figure 18 shows the isolation latency and the watch buffer size as a function of the number of 
malicious nodes. As the number of malicious nodes increases, the isolation latency slightly 
increases. This is due to the fact that an individual malicious node has less opportunity to do 
harm, which delays its detection and thus increases the average isolation latency. As we increase 
the number of malicious nodes, the watch buffer size increases since a larger number of packets 
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stays longer in the watch buffer waiting to be matched since these packets are eventually 
dropped by the malicious nodes.  
9. Conclusion 
We have presented a distributed protocol, called DICAS, for detection, diagnosis, and isolation 
of nodes launching control attacks, such as, wormhole, Sybil, rushing, sinkhole, and replay 
attacks. DICAS uses local monitoring to detect control and data traffic misbehavior, and local 
response to diagnose and isolate the suspect nodes. We analyze the security guarantees of DICAS 
and show its ability to handle attacks through a representative set of these attacks. We present a 
coverage analysis and find the probability of false alarm and missed detection. On top of DICAS, 
we build a secure lightweight routing protocol, called LSR, which also supports node-disjoint 
path discovery.  
We note that although designed for static networks, DICAS can potentially be extended to 
mobile networks. In mobile networks the neighborhood changes and therefore the neighbor 
discovery is required to be executed during the lifetime of the network. Therefore, the neighbor 
discovery protocol presented here cannot be secure for mobile networks. Note that incremental 
deployment of nodes is equivalent to a node moving to the new position and the situation can be 
handled similarly. As future work we are investigating secure neighbor discovery protocols 
appropriate for resource-constrained mobile networks. 
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